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BOOK REVIEW
THE AMBIGUITY OF NEUTRALITY
Steven K. Greent

Tm AMBIGUOUS EmBRAcE: GoVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS
AND SocLA.L AGENCIES. By Charles L. Glenn.t Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000. Pp. 304. $35.00.
Charles Glenn's The Ambiguous Embrace: Government and
Faith-Based Schools and Social Agencies explores the debate over vouchers and governmentfinancedsocialservices administeredby religious organizations, otherwise known as "charitablechoice, "from the perspective offaithbased organizations. In this Review, while ProfessorSteven K. Green compliments the book for effectively illustratinghow faith-based organizations can
be compromised and corrupted by participatingin government-funded pro.
grams, he explains that the book suffers because itfails to address the logical
implicationsof its arguments. Additionally, ProfessorGreen argues that the
Constitution does not support the book's advocacy of greatergovernment encouragement of faith-based organizations to provide education and social
services.
INTRODUCrION

For decades, legal scholars have debated whether constitutional
principles of neutrality toward religion or nonadvancement of the
same either require or prohibit government vouchers for private, religious education.' Relying on language that first appeared in a foott J.D., University of Texas; Ph.D., University of North Carolina; Visiting Professor,
Willamette University College of Law; General Counsel and Director of Policy, Americans
United for Separation of Church and State.
"#f Professor and Chairman of Administration, Training, and Policy Studies at Boston
University School of Education.
1 SeeJesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools-An Update,
75 CA L. Rxv. 5 (1987); Mark E. Chopko, ReligiousAccess to PublicProgramsand Governmenntal Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 645 (1992); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and DoctrinalDevekpment (pt. 2), 81 HARv. L. REv. 513 (1968); Steven K.
Green, The LegalArgument Against PrivateSchool Choice, 62 U. CN. L. REv. 37 (1993); Philip
E.Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment ReligiousDoctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv. 817
(1984); Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NoTR
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 375 (1999); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding
Problem:Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. Rxv. 989 (1991); Michael A. Paulson,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 311 (1986).
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note in a 1973 Supreme Court opinion,2 some commentators have
urged a constitutional construct that treats religious entities no differently than their secular counterparts when it comes to the receipt of
government funds, benefits, and contracts. As these scholars have
contended, so long as the government structures a program in a manner that neither favors nor disfavors recipients on the basis of religion
and extends any benefits on an evenhanded basis, the Establishment
Clause is not offended when some of the funds end up in the possession of religious entities or pay for religiously oriented activity.3 This
constitutional schema, bolstered by a series of Court decisions touting
neutrality as a "hallmark" of the religion clauses, 4 has emerged as the
legal rationale for vouchers and was most apparent in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's 1998 decision upholding the constitutionality of the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program.5 Over the last several years, this
neutrality theory has found a second application with the issue of government-financed social services administered by religious organizations, otherwise known as "charitable choice." A linchpin of the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 which encourages privatization of welfare
services, charitable choice authorizes religiously oriented social ser2
See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83 n.S
(1973) (suggesting the constitutionality of benefits programs "made available generally
without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefitted").
3 See STPEN V. TvMONS.M,, PosrrrvE NEura.ux
Lrm-rro REucnous Fx o t RiNG
238-41 (1993); Mark E. Chopko, Vouchers Can Be Constitutional 31 Co-x. L RE,. 945
(1999).
4 SeeZobrestv. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) ('[W]e have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of
citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment
Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2541 (2000) ("In distinguishing
between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, we
have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a
broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion."); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997) (requiring neutral and evenhanded benefit distribution for aid
programs to survive First Amendment scrutiny); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995) ("It does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public
university to grant access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of
student groups."); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Sers. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 48783
(1986) (upholding vocational assistance program "made generally available without regard
to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited"
(citing Comm.forPub.Educ. and ReigiousLiben; 413 U.S. at 782-83)); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (finding a tax deduction for education ex\penses constitutional because it applied to sectarian as well as nonsectarian education expenses).
5 SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 617 (Wis. 1998) (holding that the voucher
program provides aid to sectarian and nonsectarian private schools on the basis of "neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion" (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at
231)); see also Recent Case,Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.V.2 d 602 (Is. 1998), cert denied, 67
U.S.LW 3170 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-376), 112 Harw. L Rev. 737 (1999) (anal)zing
Jackson v. Benson).
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vice agencies-including those that integrate religious doctrine into
their programs-to receive government contracts, grants, and vouchers to provide various types of social services. 6
While neutrality serves as the theoretical framework underlying
vouchers and charitable choice, the similarities between the two
schemes do not end there. Both involve the privatization of important human services, the first being the education of our children and
the second concerning the care and rehabilitation of the poor and
dispossessed. Our nation's moral and financial commitment to education and social services is rivaled only by that to national defense
and the Social Security system; any movement toward privatization of
such important structures understandably elicits claims that the government is abdicating its responsibility for the education and care of
its citizenry. 7 As if privatization was not sufficiently controversial on its
own, vouchers and charitable choice utilize religious or "faith-based"
organizations to provide the funded educational and social services.
It cannot be gainsaid that the raison d'etre for vouchers and chari-

table choice is to involve religious organizations in government
funded human service programs. 8 Many such organizations are "pervasively sectarian" in character, being either parochial schools or
church agencies, with that term describing an institution where a religious mission permeates the operation such that the religious and
secular functions are inseparable. 9 Other factors that tie the two
schemes include a long-standing tradition of religious involvement in
education and charity work and the fact that many religious groups
view such services as integral to their religious ministries. As a result,
the legal and policy issues surrounding vouchers and charitable
choice are closely intertwined. 10 At the center of the debate over
6 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 42
U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. III 1997 & Supp. IV 1998).
7
Se STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MJICHAEL LIPsKI, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WVELFAPE
STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 188-215 (1993).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) ("The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract

with religious organizations, or to allow religious organizations to accept certificates,
vouchers, or other forms of disbursement under any program described in [this section]
9 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988) (describing a pervasively sectarian
organization as " ' an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission... .'" (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734, 743 (1973))). Some commentators have criticized the term "pervasively sectarian" for being pejorative and no longer an accurate representation of many faith-based
operations. See Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court'sDiscrimiratoryUse of the Term "Sectarian," 6J.L. & POL. 449 (1990); Chopko, supra note 1, at 658. However, I shall use the term
in this Review because it represents a term of art in Court jurisprudential parlance.
10 See Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare
as We Knew 14 49 DuaE LJ. 493 (1999).
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both schemes is the notion of neutrality and its position in the hierarchy of First Amendment values.
Entering the fray is Charles Glenn's timely book, The Ambigumus
Embrace: Government andFaith-BasedSchools and SocialAgencies ("Ambigu-

ous Embrace'), which addresses both vouchers and charitable choice
from the perspective of faith-based organizations." Although not particularly original,' 2 Ambiguous Embrace argues forcefully for the indispensable role of faith-based organizations in providing human
services and generating a sense of moral obligation essential for liberal democracies. A constant theme in Glenn's book is that government programs should be neutral toward religious entities-whether
they be churches, social service agencies, or parochial schools. Glenn
insists that to exclude faith-based organizations from participating in

such important socializing structures not only amounts to discrimination but is done so to the peril of society.' 3
Despite its strong plea for vouchers and charitable choice, the
primary focus of Ambiguous Embrace is not the constitutional or policy
arguments favoring either scheme, but on how such funding programs affect the integrity and vitality of faith-based organizations. The
book's greatest contribution to the debate is its exploration into the
various ways that participating in government-funded programs can
compromise and corrupt faith-based organizations.14 To his credit,
Glenn does notjoin the chorus of those who view government bureau11 CAM~s L GLENN, THE ANMIGUOUS EMBRAE .: Go% .xtN'%
.&-T A:,D F=rrH-Bsr
ScHooLs AND SocIAL AGEN iES (2000). Glenn, an education professor at Boston University, is a member of a cadre of leading scholars and policy analysts advocating vouchers and
charitable choice.
12 Many of the same arguments are contained in JoE Loco-,-r, SEDCCING TE S LM.A.
TAN: How GOvERmmNT CONTRACTs ARE RES
PNG SociAL SERv cEs (1997). and STEPHEN
V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR ILx: RELIGIOUS NONROmFT ORrtcxiZTioxS AND
Punuc MoNEY (1996), sources on which Glenn relies.
13 The term "faith-based" may encompass a broad range of religiously affiliated agendes and institutions, including such well-known organizations as Catholic Charities and the
Salvation Army, which have long participated in funding programs by offering essentially
secular services, albeit from a religious perspective or motivation. &e CLE.',., supra note 11,
at 37. Although Glenn would include such religiously affiliated groups in his definition, in
most instances he uses the term more narrowly to indicate groups that would be consid-

ered pervasively sectarian in organization and operation. Examples would be a traditional
Catholic parochial school, a fundamentalist Christian academy, or a program such as Teen
Challenge, which defines itself as a Christian ministry that exists to "evangelize and disiple" youth with drug dependencies. See i& at 46-49, 70.
14 See id. at 9. According to Glenn,
"[T]here is a real danger that such structures might be 'co-opted' by the
government in a too eager embrace that would destroy the very distinctiveness of their function." Government support of choice among educational
and social programs could come with so many strings attached that they
would no longer offer real alternatives, function as mediating structures, or
promote a coherent sense of moral obligation.
Id. (quoting PETER L BERGER & RiCHARDJOHN NEUHAUS, To Esu'owER PEOPLE: Fro.e ST,%TE
TO CAvi. SocirT 163 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996)).
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cracy and regulation as the primary threats to faith-based organizations. Though regulation represents a real danger for Glennespecially through the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws on employment decisions-the main threat to faith-based organizations participating in government programs comes from a loss of a sense of
mission, due to a growing dependence on funding and pressure to
professionalize staffs. 15 Refreshingly, Glenn also avoids justifying

vouchers and charitable choice through inflated success rates or based
on market theories. Rather, Glenn argues that the unique and indispensable contribution of faith-based organizations in the realm of
human services warrants vouchers and charitable choice. 16 Thus,
while Glenn champions religious participation in government educational and social service programs, he does so with a degree of
ambivalence.
This Review considers the four primary themes of Ambiguous Embrace that are of greatest interest to lawyers. 17 Part I, serving as a precursor to the central theme of neutrality, considers Glenn's argument
that a sense of "moral obligation" is essential for both education and
social services and that only private "mediating structures" such as
faith-based organizations are equipped to instill these necessary values. Related to this theme is the issue of how the nation's founders
viewed the role of religious and charitable organizations in our constitutional order, not merely in the provision of human services, but also
as custodians of the moral and civic virtues essential to the success of
the Republic. Part II then discusses Glenn's view of government neutrality toward religion and how that perspective fits within the larger
debate over the funding of faith-based schools and social service agencies. The Supreme Court's fractured holding in Mitchell v. Hems18 last
term, offering conflicting conceptions of neutrality and its role in religion clause jurisprudence, 19 has only exasperated this debate. Following the discussion of neutrality theory, Part III briefly explores
Glenn's arguments for vouchers and charitable choice. The final part
See id. at 43, 165.
See id. at 30, 112, 269-70.
17
Despite its polemical tone, the book contains much that may be of interest to social
scientists working in related fields. In several sections, Glenn compares American educational and social service practices with those in western European countries, with the latter
providing examples of closer cooperation between governments and faith-based institutions in schooling and social services than exists in America. See id. at 110-11, 120-22, 13164. Ambiguous Embrace also contains two vignette chapters, one discussing "Teen Challenge," an intensive Christian-based substance abuse program that has yet to receive public
15

16

funding, and the other considering the "success" of the Salvation Army, an organization
that has managed to maintain its identity as a church while operating one of the largest
publicly funded social service programs in the nation. See id. at 62-73, 21240.
18
19

120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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examines one aspect of the "ambiguous" relationships between faithbased organizations and the government: whether religious providers
should be held accountable to laws prohibiting employment discrimination. For Glenn and most advocates of charitable choice, the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws represents the greatest
regulatory threat to the religious integrity and mission of faith-based
organizations. Glenn's argument for exempting faith-based organizations from the coverage of such laws for publicly funded positions also

implicates notions of neutrality and is the focus of Part IV.
I

TnE

APPROPR ATE ROLE OF THE GOvER

ENr IN

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES

Controversy over the government's proper role in providing educational and social services is not new. Long beforeJohn Dewey redefined American public education with his pragmatic secularism,
professional educators such as Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, and
William Torrey Harris had secured the dominant role of the state in
the education of the nation's youth.2 0 The unifying element in their
various approaches to education, in addition to an emphasis on professionalism and government centralization and control, was a de-emphasis of a spiritual aspect to public education.2 1 This secular model
for education, one with the government firmly in control, is generally
accepted today, though it has continued to be controversial for some
education and religious groups. The government "take-over" of social
services would transpire later, and the effects and accompanying criticisms would be similar: an expanding government bureaucracy that
exercises increasing control of services through funding, standards,
and regulation and that marginalizes religious and moral alternatives.
This portrayal sets the stage for Glenn's opening theme about the
appropriate role of government in providing human services. Glenn's

argument is simple, although its implications are more subtle. Only

"mediating structures"-the value-generating and value-maintaining

agencies that mediate between individuals and the state-are capable
of communicating the values and sense of moral obligation necessary
for civil society.2 2 Traditionally, mediating structures such as
churches, parochial schools, and eleemosynary organizations educated children and ministered to human needs in ways that acknowledged and encouraged the spiritual components of personal and
I'IATIGLY, THE CASSLESS PROFESSION: AtERicAuc SCHOOL%EN IN THE Nt.%TCENruRv 63-72, 81 (1975); NEIL GERARD McCLusg-, PuBuc ScHooLs xAD MoRu.
EDUCATION 145-73 (1958).
21
MATINGLY, supra note 20, at 63-72, 81; McCL sEY, supra note 20, at 145-73.
20

PAUL

TEEIm

22

See GLENN, supra note 11, at 3 (citing BERcER & NEVHALS, supra note 14, at 164).
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social life. 23 However, with the advent of the welfare state and state
bureaucracies, the government assumed greater responsibility for providing education and social services. 24 Not only did the government's
take-over of social services displace the role of private mediating institutions, but it also substituted the normative approach to human services with one of secular relativism.25 In turn, this development has
created a hostile climate in which religion "has been chased vigorously
out of public schools and out of publicly funded nonprofit institutions, leaving what [has popularly been called] a 'naked public
26
square.'"
For Glenn, the tragedy in this development lies not only in the
exclusion of private mediating institutions from the public square, but
also in the loss of a sense of moral agency and obligation that is indispensable for the operation of civil society. Not only is government ill
equipped to instill normative values, but its emphasis on professionalization and standardization weakens the very institutions capable of
generating and perpetuating that necessary sense of moral obligation. 27 Glenn's solution is for the government to recognize its limitations and utilize private mediating institutions that can instill values
while ministering to human needs. 28 Respect for the value-forming
role of mediating institutions and a pluralistic social order demands
that the state ensure that such institutions participate in human service programs. According to Glenn, "government should entrust the
care and education of children and adults to the greatest extent possible to civil society institutions that reflect the diverse nature of the
'29
society.
Glenn's description of the post-New Deal approach to human services, while accurate in some respects, stretches the facts to fit within
his characterization of the system's shortcomings. Although private
schooling preceded public schooling in this country, public responsibility for education dates back to colonial America.3 0 Albeit often in
23

See id. at 7-8.

24
25

See id. at 165-66.

See id. at 13-23, 165-66. "[T]he state is in effect absorbing into itself the traditional
value-shaping mission of churches and other institutions of the civil society and is tempted
to do so in a fashion that drives those competitors in value-formation from the field." Id. at
18.
26
Id. at 7. Richard John Neuhaus coined the term "naked public square." See Rimc-t
ARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, at
vii (1984). For this argument, Glenn relies heavily on works by Neuhaus, Peter Berger,
Marvin Olasky, and Stephen V. Monsma. See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 14; MONSMA,
supra note 12; MARVIN OLASKY, RENEWING AMERICAN COMPASSION (1996); MARVIN OLASIKY,
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992).
27 See GLENN,supra note 11, at 6-7, 13-27.
28
See id. at 21-23.
29
Id. at 269.
30
2 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 47-52 (1950).
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partnership with local churches, several New England towns established public schools during the seventeenth century, while Benjamin
Franklin helped establish the first public academy in Philadelphia in
1753.31 The general sentiment following the American Revolution
was that the education of children was vital to the Republic's stability
and success, and the responsibility for ensuring an educated citizenry
32
rested with the government

In 1779, Thomas Jefferson proposed a plan for establishing public schools in Virginia with the belief that if "every individual which
composes the[ ] mass [of society] participates of the ultimate authority, the government will be safe."3 3 An additional sentiment was that
public education in the new nation should be nonsectarian in order
to avoid the European experience of religious conflict and dissension.
Early educators believed that they could create a new synthesis of public virtue, one that would unite diverse social and religious groups into
a common civic faith to which people could swear their lopalty.m
This commitment to a public role in education became apparent
in the early nineteenth century with the creation of common schools
in Massachusetts, New York, and Philadelphia-a movement that preceded the rise of parochial schooling in the 1830s and 1840s.35 Public
schools also sought to instill values. However, educators like Horace
Mann, whose nonsectarian schools Catholics criticized as favoring
31

1d.

Timothy L Smith, Protestant Schooling and American A'ationality, 1800.1850, 53J.Am:.
Hisr. 679, 679 (1966).
33
MAR= A. L-ARsoN, THE EssENcE oFJEFr-nsox 152 (1981). Education reformer
Noah Webster wrote in 1790 that "[i]n our American republics, where government is in
the hands of the people, knowledge should be universally diffused by means of public
schools .... An acquaintance with ethics and with the general principles of law, commerce,
money, and government is necessary for the yeomanry of a republican state." Noah Webster, On the Education of Youth in America (1790), reprintcd in Essx ON EDUCATION IINTHE
EARLY REPUBuC 43, 66 (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965).
34 See Samuel Knox, An Essay on the Best System of Liberal Education, reprintedin Essv
32

ON

EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC,

supranote 33,

at 271,332 (remarking that "however

important [religious instruction] may be, yet, on account of preserving that liberty of conscience in religious matters which various denominations of Christians in these statesjustly
claim, due regard ought to be paid to this in a course of public instruction"); Smith, supra
note 32, at 680-81 (noting that "[b]y their establishment and control of both, public and
private schools, churchmen stamped upon neighborhoods, states, and nation an interdenominational Protestant ideology which nurtured dreams of personal and social progress"); Webster, supra note 33, at 50-51 (counseling against religious instruction and
catechism and for limiting the use of the Bible to passages related to history and morality).
35 See 2 STOKES, supra note 30, at 50-67; Smith, supra note 32, at 681-85. Although
there were a handful of Catholic parochial schools in America in the early 1800s, significant numbers did not exist until after the Baltimore Provincial Councils of 1829 and 1833,
which first sanctioned their establishment and set up the framework for school development. See PmER GUILDAY, THE NATIONAL PAsTORALs OF THE AmER a HImFLRc:s 27-30, 78
(1923); ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AN STATE IN THE UNrrED STATES
227-29 (rev. ed. 1964).
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Protestantism and Evangelicals criticized as being too secular, quickly
realized the difficulty in identifying an acceptable approach to instilling values.3 6 Although the common school movement had many
shortcomings, as Glenn highlights in other works, 37 those limitations
should not overshadow the long-standing sense of public responsibility for education that exists in this country.
Similarly, a public role in providing for the needy dates back several hundred years.38 During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many northeastern cities established alms houses,
public dispensaries (hospitals), and relief programs to address the
groxwing poverty caused by urbanization and immigration.3 9 Churches
and religious reform organizations also increased their efforts in ministering to the poor.40 Not until the mid-nineteenth century, however,
did most religious charities move out of the realm of alms giving and
4
begin to develop more comprehensive responses to poverty. '
Claims that the government displaced the role of religious charitable organizations with the advent of New Deal and Great Society
programs are therefore overstated. 42 Even Glenn acknowledges that
the vast majority of private social organizations have emerged since
the 1970s, primarily in response to the expansion of government
funding.43 Glenn, however, is wrong to argue that the government
has acted with hostility toward religious social service organizations.
For years, the government has provided religious organizations such
as the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Services,
and the Council of Jewish Federations with hundreds of millions of
dollars for programs providing housing, job training, foster care, substance abuse counseling, and foodstuffs. 44 For example, in 1995, the
36

See ELLwoOD P. CUBBERLEY, READINGS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

204-10 (1934); 2 STOKES, supra note 30, at 54-58.
37 See CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MyrH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988).
38 Boston opened its first public almshouse in 1664. See DAVWDJ. RoTHiN, THE DisCOVERY OF THE AsmuLM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER INTHE NEW REPUBLIC
AID G. WALTERS, A&McAN REFORMERS, 1815-1860, at 173 (1978).
39 RoTmiAN, supra note 38, at 30-45; WALTES, supra note 38, at
40 WALTERS, supra note 38, at 175-79.
41 See RoTHmAN, supra note 38, at 155-205; WALTERS, supra note

39 (1971);

RON

173-74.

38, at 177-79. The
nineteenth century religious reform movement initially focused on evangelism and behavioral reform, with an added emphasis on charitable work in the mid-century. See TIioT-w
L. S.mrH, REvrvAUSM AND SOCIAL REFORM 34-44, 163-77 (1957).
42
See LOcoNTE, supranote 12, at 1-2; OLAsK't, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN Co.PASSIoN,

supra note 26, at 151-83.
43
See GLENN, supra note 11, at 10, 28; see also SMnTH & LIPSKY, supra note 7, at 76-77
("Starting in the 1960s, many nonprofit agencies were founded in direct response to government funding.").
44 JOHN MCCARTHY & JIM CAS-rELLI, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE NONPROFIT SEarOR RESEARCH FUND, RELIGION-SPONSORED SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE NOT-SO-INDEPENDENT
SECTOR 2-31, 48-50 (1997); see also Stephen V. Monsma, The "Pervasively Sectarian"Standard

in Theoy and Practice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 321, 322 (1999) (docu-
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year before charitable choice legislation was first enacted, Catholic

Charities USA received $1.2 billion from federal, state, and local government sources-an amount comprising sixty-two percent of the organization's budget. While it is true, as Glenn suggests, that some
faith-based agencies have either modified their programs to receive
public funding or been excluded from participating in government
programs because of prohibitions on funding pervasively sectarian institutions, many more religious organizations have participated comfortably in the system by offering secular services while retaining their
46
identity or sense of mission.
History and practice aside, Glenn's critique raises important questions about the state's appropriate role in providing human services,
and more fundamentally, in instilling normative values among its citizenry. As Glenn asks, "to what extent should government concern itself with changing the way people are, with how they think and what
they value?" 47 This centuries old question lies at the heart of the over
two-hundred-year-old church-state debate. Unquestionably the Founders believed that civic virtue and moral responsibility were indispensable human qualities for the nation's survival.48 The Founders also
acknowledged the important role of religious institutions in civil society and assumed that these institutions would be the primary transmitters of religious and moral values. 49 The debate turns on whether the
Founders provided for the maintenance of such normative values
within the constitutional structure. Only a theocrat would argue that

the state itself should assume the role of church council or priest.
Glenn's insistence that the government should not seek to instill
menting a "lively, continuing partnership between government and nonprofit service organizations, including faith-based ones").
1996 A.NNA
45 CATHOuc CHArrs U.SA, A VISION FOR FAnUEs AND Co.ttNmEns
REPORT 22 (1997); accord LocoNTE, supranote 12, at44 (documenting that Catholic Charities of Boston received sixty-txvo percent of its tivent)-eight million dollar budget from federal and state sources, making it the largest private social service agency in Massachusetts).
46 A persistent theme in Ambiguous Embraceis that religious organizations cannot be
true to their mission by offering secular programs that do not integrate religious doctrine.
See GL.NN, supra note 11, at 245. Espoused by many charitable choice proponents, this
argument insults the thousands of religiously affiliated agencies that view secular-oriented
services as compatible with their religious mission. See Fred Kammer, 10 zys Catholic CharitiesAre Catholic,availableat http://wv.cathollccharitiesusa.org/beliefs/10wa)s2.html (last
visited Sept. 11, 2000). Glenn mildly criticizes the Salvation Army for modiTing its programs over the years to qualify for public funding. See GLENN, supranote 11, at 217, 220-34.
However, he offers little evidence to show that its religious mission has suffered or that its
programs have become less effective as a result of those modifications. See id.
47 GLENN, supra note 11, at 14.
48
SeeJohn Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776), in 1 Astmc.AN PotncaL WRM-us
DURING = FoUNDiNG ERA 1760-1805, at 401, 401-09 (Charles S. H)neman & Donald S.
Lutz eds., 1983).
49
See Samuel Kendal, Reigion the Only Sure Basis of Frw Government (1804), in 2 AmftuRITAL
ING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 1241, 1241-63 (Charles S.
cAN PoLc
Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
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moral values is likely to resonate with both liberals and conservatives. 50 But this consensus hides the deep divisions about whether the
state should go beyond assuming the existence of private mediating
institutions to enhancing their value-shaping role in society. Glenn, of
course, argues that the state should actively encourage faith-based approaches to human services through funding and removal of disabling
regulations. 51 Merely because the government itself cannot instill val-

ues does not mean it should not seek out faith-based partners to fill
the gap. 52
This approach contrasts with the more traditional liberal position

of religious agnosticism in which the state neither encourages nor discourages religious fealty. The state may validate religious institutions,

but only for their secular contribution to society.5 3 As reflected in the
Court's separationist holdings reflecting a relationship of "benevolent

neutrality,"54 churches and religious organizations are left ,aloneto determine their own beliefs and governance,5 5 are accommodated in
their practices, 56 and are exempted from taxation and minor regula50 Glenn further denies that government institutions, such as public schools, can
identify and transmit commonly shared values that transcend the secular-religious gulf and
promote a common civic virtue. Interestingly, Glenn's argument that government is una.
ble to instill normative values parallels those made by liberal theorists such as John Rawls
and Ronald Dworkin who insist that in a liberal democracy government should abstain
from expressing its own views on normative questions, especially on matters that lack a
consensus of opinion, at the risk of stifling pluralism and alternative viewpoints. See RoN.
ALD DWORmIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-204 (1985); JOHN RAwIS, A THEORY OFJusTICS
186-94 (rev. ed. 1999).
51 See GLENN, supranote 11, at 267-69.
52 See id. As discussed in the following section, Glenn's position that government
should actively encourage faith-based approaches fails a central tenet of neutrality. See
infra Part II.
53 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("The state has an affirmative policy that considers these groups [churches and other nonprofit quasi-public corpora.
tions] beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds [tax exempt status]
useful, desirable, and in the public interest."). See in particular the exchange between
Justices Brennan and Scalia in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, over the rationale underlying
religious accommodations and whether government can value religion qua religion. 489
U.S. 1, 10-17 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (arguing for the unconstitutionality of benefits limited
exclusively to religious organizations); id. at 33-41 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (pointing out that
accommodation of religion as required by the First Amendment requires the state to provide benefits exclusively to religions). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1952) ("When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of
our traditions.").
54 Wal, 397 U.S. at 669, 676.
55 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 (1979) (deferring to the church's own definition of its "true congregation" for the purpose of a dispute over ownership of church property); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 72021 (1976) (refusing to overturn the church's reorganization of its diocese, on the grounds
that it was a matter of "internal church government").
56 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (upholding the provision of Title VII that exempts
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tion 57 but otherwise excluded from enjoying the benefits of extensive
government sponsorship. Most importantly, the government is disabled from opining on the merits of any religious perspective. 58 This
division represents a fundamental conflict over the way in which the
state can acknowledge and use religious entities to assist in furthering
the commonweal.
The main issue for Glenn, however, is not merely the extent of
government sponsorship of religious programs, but who is responsible
for those programs in the first instance. Government has "overstep[ped] the limits of its appropriate role" in providing education
and social services because its activities are never value-free 5 9 Government should "turn to nonprofit organizations to provide services 'in
areas where direct government control is held to be undesirable' ...
because they involve the formation of opinions and values, especially
if there are deep divisions in the society over what worldview should
60
be promoted."
This argument puts public schools, in particular, in an untenable
position: they are unqualified to teach the values we agree are necessary in a civil society, but then are criticized for not addressing the
myriad emotional needs of children in normative ways. 6 1 The only

solution is for the state to remove itself from the business of education
(and social services) and limit itself to collecting and distributing tax
revenues. Wherever else this argument leads, it does not support a
market-based school voucher system which always assumes that some
religious organizations from the prohibition against discrimination in employment on the
basis of religion); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 501-07 (1979) (refusing
to construe the National Labor Relations Act as conferring NLRBjurisdiction over schools
operated by a church to teach both religious and secular subjects).
57 See Wa/z, 397 U.S. at 676 ("All of the 50 states provide for tax exemption of places of
worship .... "). But seeJimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 397
(1990) (upholding California's imposition of sales and use tax liability on a church's sale
of religious material); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-06
(1985) (subjecting nonprofit religious organizations to the recordkeeping provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act).
58 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) ("TIThe prohibition
against governmental endorsement of religion 'preclude[s] government from conveying
or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief isfavored or
pieferred'"(alteration and emphasis in original)). For the government to expressly seek out
faith-based organizations for their value-shaping role raises church-state endorsement
concerns.
59 GLENN, supranote 11, at 17 ("Put another way, popular schooling is the instrument
that an activist government is most tempted to employ to bring about social transformation
and that, having started to use, it is most likely to use ever more deliberately and
extensively.").
60
Id. at 21 (quoting Christopher Hood et al., Nalional Governnent-Lezrd Serrics in Six
Countries, in DEUVERING PUBuC SERVICES IN WESrERN EUROPE: StumHcN WESrERN EUROPE
EXPERENCE OF PARA-GOVERNmENr ORawZA.xnoN 59, 61 (Christopher Hood & Gunnar
Folke Schuppert eds., 1988)).
61
See id. at 20-21.
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parents will choose secular public education for their children and
that public schools will improve through increased competition.
Rather, this libertarian argument leads to the privatization of education and most social services. Under this schema, the only appropriate alternatives are private religious schools and faith-based social
62
service programs.
Glenn is hesitant to acknowledge where his privatization argument leads, primarily because he sees a continuing role for government in these areas. "There are good reasons," Glenn argues, "for
government to continue an active role-perhaps even more active, in
some respects, than at present-in ensuring that educational and social services are adequate and accessible, even as it turns to civil society
institutions to deliver those services." 63 Glenn envisions a cooperative
relationship between government and the private sector with the state
retaining important responsibilities for ensuring that services are
fairly and equitably distributed.64 But at its core, Glenn advocates a
model in which the government abstains from providing those services itself, with its responsibilities limited to facilitating and funding

the operations of private mediating institutions. This would represent
a fundamental shift in the way educational and social services are provided in this country, a change that Ambiguous Embrace only indirectly
acknowledges. Glenn's unwillingness to directly address this issue is a
major weakness of the book.
II

THE NATURE

OF GOVERNMENT NEUTRALITY

TowARD RELGION
The foregoing discussion about the role of faith-based organizations in providing educational and social services sets the stage for the
book's central legal theme of government neutrality toward religion.
According to Glenn, for too long, government entities have structured
their programs in ways that discriminate against religious organizations, requiring them to de-emphasize if not sanitize those religious
aspects that distinguish religious organizations and make them effective. 65 These practices derive from Court holdings prohibiting the
funding of pervasively sectarian organizations or programs with relig62
See id. at 247-51, 262-64 (criticizing religious agencies that have a spiritual approach
but are not distinctly religious).
63 Id. at 22.
64 Id. at 23 ("Government's role in generating revenues equitably from the entire
society, protecting the interests of the poor and vulnerable in the name ofjustice, promoting common standards (carefullyl), and stimulating activity where it has not arisen spontaneously is entirely consistent with a vigorous civil society.").
65
See i. at 74-98.
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ious content.6 6 This "strict separationist" position has grown out of a
distrust of faith-based perspectives and a bias toward a secularist ideology that, according to Glenn, "seeks to make converts" of its owm. 67
"But [the] exclusion of religious speech and motivations, of religious
organizations and programs from equal participation in the 'public
square' and in public funding is not neutral in its effects."6 In place
of the strict separationist model or its rival "strict neutrality"-which
mechanically treats religion no better or worse than nonreligionGlenn advocates a framework that he terms "positive neutrality,"
which entitles religious organizations to participate equally with their
nonreligious counterparts in government programs and benefits
while accommodating the unique attributes of the religious entities.69
Rather than being agnostic to the special contribution of religious organizations and treating them no differently than their secular counterparts, positive neutrality "takes the position that government

should under some circumstances give its support to religious activities and motivations, when they serve a purpose whose benefits are
primarily social rather than religious in nature."70 For Glenn, it is
"not enough that faith-based organizations be eligible for funding unless they are also protected from interference with how they approach
71
the work for which they are funded."
Positive neutrality, therefore, "rests upon a pluralistic understanding of the political and social order that recognizes the important role
of faith communities and associations alongside other forms of voluntary organization in maintaining society and in transmitting the habits
and values that sustain it."72 In a sense, religion serves as a counterweight to the secularly-based government programs. Positive neutrality would not prohibit faith-based schools and agencies from using
public funds for religiously infused programs, provided government
receives its secular value for the services rendered.7 3
Glenn seems unsure, however, whether positive neutrality simply
removes barriers to funding religious organizations-while lifting burId. at 83.
Id. at 76. "The myth that secularism is a neutral position between belief and unbelief is widely accepted, despite its inherent absurdity." Id. at 20.
66
67
68

Id. at 76.

Glenn's critique of the separationist perspective and his understanding of"positive
neutrality" borrows heavily from the works of Stephen V. Monsma and Carl H. Esbeck. S~e
MONsMA, supra note 3, at 188-209; Carl H. Esbeck, A ConstitutionalCasefor Goernanental
Cooperation with Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers,46 EFoaR, LJ. 1 (1997).
70
GiLr-N, supranote 11, at 77.
71
Id. at 101.
69

72

I&at 78.

See id. at 77,97-98; MoNs.A, supranote 3, at 192; see alsoEsbeck, supra note 69, at 17
n.68 (discussing Justice Kennedy's opinion in Bowen v. Kendrid, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), es73

pousing this view).
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dening regulations-or goes further to require the government to
seek out religious solutions and alternatives for education and social
services. The former model mandates equal treatment of religious entities-albeit in a modified form-while the latter results in government encouragement of religious solutions. Glenn advances both
models, 74 although he seems oblivious to the inconsistencies between
the two. Yet despite occasional references to equal treatment, 75 Glenn
prefers the latter model. 76 Because government secularity itself is
nonneutral, positive neutrality would require government to fashion
many of its own programs in ways that facilitate a religious perspective. 77 To use Glenn's own example of public charter schools, once
the state has decided to offer a variety of curricula and approaches in
public education, it could not prevent the formation of a charter
school with a "biblical basis."78 Under positive neutrality, therefore,
the government should seek out religious solutions for education and
social services due to religion's unique ability to transmit values and
instill a sense of moral obligation.
Glenn's formulation of neutrality evinces a misunderstanding of
the Court's religion clause and free speech holdings and of the inher-

ent authority of the government to structure its programs in ways that
validate particular perspectives. 79 To a degree, he can be forgiven for
his misunderstanding, for few legal concepts are more ambiguous.
Neutrality is "a coat of many colors," the second Justice Harlan once
remarked, and the concept is open to many interpretations8 0 The
Court first spoke of neutrality in Everson v. Board ofEducation, the 1947
parochial school bussing case, considered by many to be the archetypal separationist opinion.8 Since then, the high court identified
11, at 100-04.
See id. at 98, 270.
76 See id. at 100, 104.
77 See id. at 127-28.
78 Id. Glenn also criticizes the Court's holdings regarding religious expression in
schools as lacking neutrality toward religion. Id. at 75-76. In so criticizing, Glenn fails to
distinguish between government sponsored settings and open fora that lend themselves to
a variety of perspectives. See discussion infra notes 110-25. Glenn also seeks to highlight
inconsistencies between holdings prohibiting financial aid to parochial schools but permitting similar aid to church-related colleges and religiously affiliated social service agencies,
See id. at 79-90. Nonetheless, Glenn acknowledges that "most religious nonprofits receiving
public money are not pervasively sectarian" as are parochial schools. Id. at 88.
79 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-95 (1991); infra notes 110-25.
80 Bd. of Educ. v. Alien, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
81 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (declaring that the government could not exclude "the members of any ... faith, because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of
public welfare legislation" (emphasis omitted)). Justice Black, the author of Everson, would
later dissent from the Court's 1968 decision upholding the provision of secular textbooks
to public and parochial schools, arguing that neutrality had its limits, especially where it
resulted in state finances "actively and directly assist[ing] the teaching and propagation of
sectarian religious viewpoints."). Allen, 392 U.S. at 253 (Black, J., dissenting).
74
75

GLENN, supranote
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neutrality as a goal in rulings as seemingly inconsistent as upholding
tax exemptions for churches8 2 and prohibiting tax credits for tuition
at parochial schools. 8 3 Maintaining "neutrality" has also been the ra-

tionale for prohibiting school-sponsored prayer and Bible readings,I
but permitting student religious clubs on secondary school campuses. 85 Clearly, when the Court affirmed neutrality in these various
contexts it could not have been speaking about the same concept.
Consider, for example, the divergent opinions of Justices Brennan
and Scalia in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.86 Both assigned neutrality

as the touchstone principle for striking and permitting, respectively, a
tax exemption limited to religious magazines and publications.87 The
Court has used the term to represent quite distinct concepts-as a
median between being pro- and antireligious, as a synonym for "secular," and as a form of evenhanded treatment-but most often in a
conclusory manner. 88 One need only peruse the multiple opinions in
Mitchell v. Helms, each offering divergent views of neutrality, to appreciate the confusion and division that exists over this concept 8 9 The
scholarly literature on the subject has been equally diverse. Some assert that neutrality is the complement to nonadvancement while
others claim it is its antithesis.90 The concept is so ambiguous that we
82
SeelWalz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (referring to a regime of'benevolent neutrality").
83 See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973)
(declaring that "our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither
'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' religion" (quoting Ifalz 397 U.S. at 669)).
84 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
85
See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (O'Connor, J.).
86 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
87 See supranote 53.
88 See Justice Souter's discussion of the term "neutrality" in Nlitchell v. Helms, 120 S.
Ct. 2530, 2578-81 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1993) (evenhanded); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983)
(same); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (secular); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (median); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968) (secular);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (median)).
89
Compare Mitchel 120 S. Ct. at 2556-58 (O'ConnorJ., concurring injudgment) (arguing that to determine whether aid to a religious organization is constitutional, the Court
has considered and should consider other factors besides neutrality, such as whether the
organization uses government aid to fund its religious objectives), uith id.at 257882 (SouterJ., dissenting) (discussing the three wa)s in which the Court has dewed neutrality first,
as a median position between aiding and handicapping religion; second, as a requirement
that the state confine itself to secular objectives; and third, as a requirement that the organization provide a nonreligious benefit); see also infra note 100 (discussing the viesv ofJustices O'Connor and Souter).
90 CompareEsbeck, supranote 69 (describing neutrality as "separation's major competitor" for the basis of Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions), with Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separationand NeutraliO; 46 Eiow, L.J. 43 (1997) [hereinafter
Laycock, Underlying Unity] (arguing that separation is not fundamentally different from
neutrality); see also Alan E. Brownstein, Intepr-dingthe Religion Clauses in Tens of Liberty,
Equality, and FreeSpeech Values-A CytikalAnalysis of Weutrality Theay" and CarlitableChoice,
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truly can "agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed

on anything at all."91
Despite this checkered pedigree, a more coherent notion of neutrality began to emerge from the Court-or at least from its more conservative members-in the mid-1980s. 92 Many view this version of
neutrality-evenhanded treatment of religious entities under generally applicable laws-as the counterpoise to the more separationist
nonadvancement position in Establishment Clause jurisprudence 3
Increasingly, these "two bedrock principles" of equal treatment and
nonadvancement have been on a collision course, despite their "equal
...jurisprudential

pedigree."94 Evenhanded neutrality, though, is on

the ascent.
Glenn's version of positive neutrality, adapted from works by
professors Stephen Monsma and Carl Esbeck, 95 is closest to Justice
Thomas's plurality opinion in Mitchell There, Justice Thomas declared that, pursuant to the principle of neutrality:
13 NoTRE DAMEJ.L. ETmics & PUB. POL'Y 243 (1999) (criticizing neutrality theory for its
fhilure to address equality, its potential to limit the expression of religious organizations,
and its failure to protect minority religions); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path ofAmerican Relig.
ious Liberty: From the OriginalTheology to FormalNeutrality and an UncertainFuture,75 IND. L.J.
1 (2000) (arguing that neutrality's emphasis on equal, not special, treatment for religion
ignores religion's distinct and inherent importance and threatens religious liberty); Douglas Laycock, Forma4 Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAtL L,
REv. 993 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, DisaggregatedNeutrality] (supporting the Court's use
of substantive neutrality in its Establishment Clause doctrine and arguing that it requires
government to minimize the impact of its actions on religious decisions); Michael W, McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146 (1986) (urging that
reliance on neutrality is justified in most Establishment Clause cases but that in some cases,

such as those involving public schools, departure from strict neutrality is required);
Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HAIv. C.t-C.L L. Rav. 505
(1998) (urging a rejection of formal neutrality in favor of an approach better able to secure religious liberty and equality); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,PublicSquares and Voucher
Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243 (1996) (arguing that neutrality requires government speech to be non-neutral in the sense that it must avoid an
official endorsement of religion);John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment
Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 83 (1986) (arguing against absolute applications of
neutrality principle in favor of a more flexible approach that recognizes 'constitutional
pluralism').
91 Laycock, DisaggregatedNeutrality, supra note 90, at 994.
92 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1988); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-89 (1986); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398-99.
93 Of course, the neutrality theory has had an even greater impact in the Free Exercise context since Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause permits the state to prohibit religious use of peyote and to deny employments benefits to a person discharged for such use), a decision generally deplored by both
separationists and accommodationists. For a discussion of neutrality's relevance in this
context, see supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
94 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847, 849 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
95 See MONSMA, supra note 3, at 188-209; Esbeck, supra note 69, at 20-38.
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if the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all
who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to say that any
aid going to a religious
recipient only has the effect of furthering
96
that secular purpose
One way to assure that a program is neutral, according to Justice
Thomas, is whether it contains the counterweight of "private choice,"
which determines "what schools [and agencies] ultimately benefit
from the governmental aid, and how much." 97 With these two elements cojoined, Establishment Clause concerns evaporate, even if
some public funds are diverted for religious uses.9 8 Although neutrality generally operates as a constitutional principle in situations where
legislatures have affirmatively opened benefits programs to religious
organizations, it does not mandate their inclusion. One can assume,
however, from Justice Thomas's discussion in Mitchell that he would
agree with Glenn that the exclusion of religious actors under neutral
funding programs evinces discrimination against religion."9
At first glance, Glenn's version of neutrality appears consistent
with that of the Mitchell plurality. However, the marriage becomes
strained as Glenn takes neutrality in directions the Court's conservative block is unwilling to go. 10 0 Justice Thomas apparently sees private
96 Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2541 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion)
(citation omitted).

97 I. at 2541 (Thomas,J, plurality opinion) ("For if numerous priate choices, rather
than the single choice of a government, determine the distribution of aid pursuant to
neutral eligibility criteria, then a government cannot, or at least cannot easily, grant special
favors that might lead to a religious establishment."). AlthoughJustice Thomas states that
private choice "assure[s]" neutrality, id. (Thomas, J., plurality opinion), as if choice helps
achieve that value, he also states that "private choices help to ensure neutrality," apparently
meaning it protects neutrality. Id. at 2542 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added). WhetherJustice Thomas intended both meanings is unclear, as they are very different in their description of the effect private choice has on neutrality.
98 The Mitchefl plurality acknowledged that public resources had been diverted for
religious purposes in that case. See i& at 2547 (ThomasJ, plurality opinion). As the Court
notedSo long as the government aid is not itself"unsuitable for use in the public
schools because of religious content," and eligibility for aid is determined
in a constitutionally permissible manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate
cannot be attributed to the government and is thus not of constitutional
concern.
I& (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
99 See GL.ENN, supra note 11, at 69; see also Justice Thomas's dissent from denial of
certiorari in Columbia Union Coil. v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013, 1014-15 (1999) (characterizing
the exclusion of a religious college from a state funding program as evincing "invidious
religious discrimination"); Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 836-37 (finding viewpoint discrimination
where university funding program denied aid to religious publication).
100 Even assuming that a convergence of views existed, Justice Thomas's version of
neutrality does not command a majority of the current Court. Justices O'Connor and Souter disagreed strongly with Justice Thomas's analysis and his apparent use of neutrality as
the sole determinative factor in Establishment Clause cases. Sre Mildid, 120 S. Ct. at 2557
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choice as a crucial, if not necessary, element in the constitutional
equation, implying that direct grants to religious agencies and schools
under a general schema would still be problematic. 10 1 In contrast,
Glenn would not require the presence of private choice or a third
party payee as under a voucher system, but would allow direct monetary grants to religious agencies that could be used for religious activities. In fact, for Glenn, the entire function of the neutrality principle
is to permit funding of agencies and schools that infuse their programs with spirituality.10 2 Although Glenn sees advantages to a
voucherized system over one involving direct grants, those pluses have
nothing to do with bolstering the constitutionality of a program by
"breaking the chain" of government advancement of religion; 10 3
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[W]e have never held that a government-aid
program passes constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a
basis for distributing aid."); id. at 2581 (SouterJ., dissenting) (discussing the "insufficiency
of evenhandedness [sic] neutrality as a stand-alone criterion of constitutional intent or
effect"). AlthoughJustices O'Connor and Souter share a belief in the insufficiency of neutrality as a constitutional axiom, they diverge on how much weight to assign to other considerations, such as the likelihood that government funds will be used for religious
purposes. See supra note 89.
101
"Of course, we have seen 'special Establishment Clause dangers' when money is
given to religious schools or entities directly rather than, as in 1itters and Mueller, indirectly." Mitchel; 120 S. Ct. at 2546 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted); see
also Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 842 ("[Wle have recognized special Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions.");
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (describing the state-paid sign
language interpreter as providing only an "indirect economic benefit" and that "no funds
traceable to the government ever find their way into sectarian schools' coffers"). However,
Justice Thomas's understanding of the role of private choice is inconsistent, with him
downplaying its significance later in AfitcheUh "Although the presence of private choice is
easier to see when aid literally passes through the hands of individuals-which is why we
have mentioned directness in the same breath with private choice-there is no reason why
the Establishment Clause requires such a form." 120 S. Ct. at 2545 (Thomas, J., plurality
opinion) (citations omitted). This statement, however, precedes the above-quoted qualifying statement about direct money grants.
102 As Esbeck describes it:
[I]n neutrality theory it makes no difference whether a provider is "pervasively sectarian" or whether the nature of the direct aid is such that it can be
diverted to a religious use. Most importantly, the courts no longer need to
ensure that governmental funds are used exclusively for "secular, neutral,
and nonideological purposes," as opposed to worship or religious instruction. Neutrality theory eliminates the need for the judiciary to engage in
such alchemy.
Esbeck, supra note 69, at 37 (footnotes omitted). Esbeck also states:
The neutrality principle... requires only that the Court examine the outcome of the welfare program with an eye to determining whether the public purpose is being served by the social service provider. If so, then the
judicial inquiry is at an end, for the government has received full "secular"
value in exchange for taxpayer funds.
Id. at 17 n.68.
103 This is not to suggest that the existence of "private choice" renders the benefits
flowing from a funding program "indirect" and thus constitutional. See Steven YL Green,
PrivateSchool Vouchers and the Confusion Over "Direct"Aid,10 Gao. MASoN U. Civ. RTs. LJ. 47
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rather, vouchers provide greater protection for religious organizations
by limiting government regulation and oversight' ° 4
The Court's view of religion clause neutrality also has a Free Exercise side that Glenn is unwilling to accept. Central to Glenn's view of
neutrality is that the Constitution entitles religious entities to participate equally in government funding programs but exempts them
from most government regulations that accompany the funding programs. Although charitable choice proponents got their way in the
Welfare Reform Act through express language protecting the religious identity of religious providers and exempting them from Title
VII,'0 5 Glenn and his allies believe the Constitution mandates these
exclusions. For at least the present, however, the constitutional mandate goes the other direction. Religious organizations and claimants
are not exempt from neutral laws of general applicability, even if their
application has a disproportionate impact on religious practice.'0 6
While some courts may view charitable choice's regulatory exemptions
as reasonable accommodations designed to avoid government entanglement with religion, others may not because government funding is
involved. Regardless of whether such special treatment accommo-

dates or advantages religion, the Free Exercise Clause under the
Court's view of neutrality does not require special treatment. 10 7 This
is the downside to neutrality as the operative principle for the religion
clauses. Those who advocate neutrality as the be-all and end-all of
religion dause jurisprudence have "traded our constitutional birthright to engage in religious practices free from government interference for the pottage of government subsidies."10 8 To be sure, the
neutrality principle does not bar all special treatment of religion. Justice Scalia, author of Employment Division v. Smith and the Court's leading proponent of neutrality theory, would have allowed the Texas
state legislature to exempt religious magazines-and only religious
magazines-from state sales taxes as a permissible accommodation of

(1999/2000) (arguing that the Court cannot find vouchers constitutional on the grounds
that they are indirect aid).
104 See GLNN, supranote 11, at 112-19.
105 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d), (f) (Supp. IV 1998).
106 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990).
107

See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (upholding expanded Title VII exemption for religious
organizations as a permissible accommodation of religion while opining that the exemption was likely not required by the Free Exercise Clause).
108 Alan Brownstein, ConstitutionalQuestionsAbout CharitableChiwle, in WELFARE Rarornt
AN FArrH-BAsED ORGAIzAnoxs 219, 248 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999) [hereinafter WELFAE REFoRM]; see also Conkle, supra note 90, at 25 ("[T]he immediate impact
of formal neutrality may seem beneficial for religion, but its long-term effect, at least in
some contexts, may be to contaminate and secularize religion.").
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religion. 10 9 But freedom from regulation via legislative largess provides little security for religious organizations.
In addition to lacking basis in Supreme Court jurisprudence,
Glenn's version of positive neutrality suffers from several other defects. Most importantly, Glenn's argument that neutrality mandates
religious inclusion in government programs fails to distinguish between those types of funding programs that are designed to provide
benefits to a broad class of recipients and those that are tied more
intimately to the government's proprietary functions and are designed
to advance specific governmental goals. 110 In these latter areas,
termed "managerial domains" by Robert Post, the government can
structure its programs to achieve explicit governmental objectives by
excluding particular viewpoints or perspectives without engaging in
impermissible discrimination."' For example, the Department of
Veterans Affairs could decide-as it apparently has-that medical
care is the appropriate course of treatment in its V.A. hospitals and

refuse to employ Christian Science practitioners or Native American
shamans who undoubtedly offer a different perspective on the treatment of illness. 112 Such "discrimination" in a government program is
permissible because the government can, "without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way."" 83 The same principle holds true for the precharitable
choice restrictions on funding pervasively sectarian entities or using
funds on religious activities. Certainly, it is reasonable for the government to insist on a secular, nonideological approach to publicly
funded human services as a way of ensuring that it receives full secular
value for its money and that all programs are amenable to the greatest
number of beneficiaries. The fact that the government narrows the
scope of its program in a manner that excludes a religious approach
to social services or education does not mean it has engaged in constitutionally suspect discrimination or has imposed an unconstitutional

109
110

See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See GLENN, supranote 11, at 76-79, 127-28.
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151, 164 (1996).

111
112 Cf Rustv. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting that merely because the government established the National Endowment for Democracy to "encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles it was not required to fund a program to encourage
competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism" (citation
omitted)).
113 I& at 193.
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condition on a protected right.'1 4 Rather, the government has merely
chosen to provide services in a particular manner.1 1 5
Granted, when the government establishes a forum with the express purpose of encouraging a diversity of views from private speakers, the Constitution constrains its ability to choose between proffered
perspectives." 6 But even the RosenbergerCourt acknowledged that this
nondiscrimination principle has scant application outside the context
of a free speech forum," 7 a point reiterated in NationalEndowmentfor
the Arts v. Finley.118 Glenn confuses such speech-enhancing funding
programs with those designed by the government to achieve specific
goals or with those in which enhancing speech is a by-product.1 1 9
In such managerial domains, "speech is necessarily and routinely
constrained on the basis of both its content and its viewpoint."12 0 This
is true even where the government enlists private entities to adminis-

ter those programs or "convey its own message."121 As the Court

noted in Rosenberger, "[w]hen the government disburses public funds
to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legit114 See Carl H. Esbeck, The Neutral Trealment of Reigion, in Wr.VEA Rzro.%i, supra note
108, at 173, 177 ("[T]he exclusion of certain religious providers based on what they believe
and because of how they practice and express what they believe, is discrimination on the
bases of religious exercise and religious speech.").
115 SeeRosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Rust,
500 U.S. at 193-94.
116 See Rosenberg; 515 U.S. at 834.
117 See i4 at 833. The Court notedWe recognized [in Rust v. Sullivan] that when the government appropriates
public funds to promote a particular policy of its owm it is entitled to say
what it wishes. When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by
the grantee.
Id. (citation omitted).
118 524 U.S. 569, 586-88 (1998). Justices Scalia and Thomas were even firmer on this
point
It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points ofview on
(in modem times, at least) innumerable subjects.... And it makes not a bit
of difference, insofar as either common sense or the Constitution is concerned, whether these officials further their (and, in our democracy, our)
favored point of view by achieving it directly... or by giving money to
others who achieve or advocate it.... None of this has anything to do with
abridging anyone's speech.
Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
119 See GLEN, supra note 11, at 98 (arguing for the inclusion of religious entities in
funding programs on the authority of Rosenbepre). However, Rosenktrger recognizes the
distinction between government programs that use private speakers to achieve specific
goals and programs established for the purpose of encouraging "adiversity of vievis from

private speakers." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34 (affirming holding in Rust by stating:
"There, the government did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead
used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its owm program.").
Post, supra note 111, at 166.
120
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
121
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imate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither gar122
bled nor distorted by the grantee."'

This first point highlights a second problem with Glenn's neutrality argument. Like many charitable choice proponents, Glenn loses
sight of the true beneficiary under PRWORA. The purpose of the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and other

social service measures is not to enhance the speech or agenda of the
agency providing the services. Rather, the purpose is to assist and empower welfare recipients. 123 This again is why a Rosenberger model is

inapposite for such funding schemes. In that case, the funding was
intended to enhance the speech of the same individuals who received
the funds, whereas under charitable choice, the religious agencies
serve as intermediaries. 124 Although the government cannot discriminate against recipients on the basis of their religious perspectives and
affiliations when it comes to providing services, it can choose the message it wishes to accompany its programs, even if it uses private con125
tractors and grantees.
Third, one cannot accurately characterize Glenn's version of neutrality, with its numerous exemptions for religious organizations from
government regulations and oversight, as an even-handed approach.
Setting aside for the moment PRWORA's authorization of employment discrimination in publicly funded positions-an exemption not
afforded secular providers-one can hardly consider charitable
choice to treat religious and secular providers alike. Only with religious providers is the government prohibited from controlling the message of its grantees. 12 6 For Glenn, this provision is crucial for
ensuring that the faith-based organizations maintain their identity and
integrity. He makes a strong case for how government bureaucracy
and oversight gradually undermine an organization's mission and
12 7
effectiveness.
122 Id.; see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88 (affirming the government's ability to fund a
program in the manner of its choice). Glenn discusses the various types of funding arrangements available to religious providers-contracts, vouchers, grants, subsidies,
franchises-but is primarily concerned with how much regulation accompanies the various
arrangements and how that affects the autonomy of the faith-based entities. His discussion

does not acknowledge that a particular funding arrangement may determine whether the
provider is acting independently or as a government agent or surrogate. See GLENN, supra
note 11, at 99-130.
123
See Brownstein, supra note 108, at 251-52.
124
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840; see also Finley, 524 U.S. 573-74 (describing funding
through the National Endowment for the Arts).
125
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting that "when the Government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that
program.").
126
See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
127
See GLENN, supra note 11, at 99-104.
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The recurring theme in Ambiguous Embrace is that "[p]rotecting
the ability of faith-based agencies and schools to be unlihe those operated by government is essential both to their own integrity and also to
the contribution that they can make to a diverse society." 2 8 However,
if Glenn is correct, this special treatment of religious entities cannot
be justified on grounds of neutrality. While special treatment may
minimize the government's influence on religious entities,'9 it has
the additional effect of skewing the marketplace of ideas in favor of
religion. In so doing, it contravenes a central tenet of neutrality the-

ory: government actions should not influence private religious
choices.' 30 As the legislative record indicates, charitable choice is not
merely about allowing religious agencies to participate equally in government-funded social services; rather, it is based on the premise that
a faith-based approach is both superior to and more effective than the

"worn out" secular approach.' 31
Consequently, charitable choice requires the government to remain hands-off in its treatment of faith-based providers, allowing them
to communicate their religious message unfettered. On one level, this
unequal treatment creates the impression that religious and moral so-

lutions to human problems are superior and preferable. Yet setting
aside concerns of government imprimatur, these exemptions provide

a powerful advantage to religious providers not afforded to secular
providers, resulting in the very type of viewpoint discrimination Glenn

disdains. Only religious providers are free to communicate their ideological message to welfare recipients and seek to influence their religions choices. 13 2 Additionally, "[fireedom from regulatory burdens
33
empowers institutions":'
It reduces their costs, and increases their ability to exercise control
over their members, attract new adherents, fulfill their normative
mission and, perhaps most importantly, maintain their sense of continuous and distinct identity. The ability to engage in conduct that
satisfies moral requirements and to perform rituals that demonstrate allegiance to a belief system or deity without state interference
128
129

, at

104.

See Laycock, DisaggregatedNeutrality, supra note 90, at 1002 ("Government must be

neutral so that religious belief and practice can be free. The autonomy of religious belief
and disbelief is maximized when government encouragement and discouragement is
minimized.").
130 Esbeck suggests that the goal of neutrality is "to minimize the effects of governmental action on individual or group choices concerning religious belief and practice." Esbeck, supra note 69, at 4; see also Laycock, Underlying Uniy, supra note 90, at 69-70
(describing Esbeck's views).
131 See Minow, supranote 10, at 529-30;Julie A. Segal, A "Holy Mistaken Zeal': The Legislative Histy and Future of CharitableChoke in WIVELUFREzroi., supranote 108, at 9, 9-27.
132
For a fuller discussion of this problem, see Brownstein, supranote 108, at 240-45;
Brownstein, supra note 90, at 246-47.
133
Browstein, supranote 90, at 271.
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reinforces viewpoints and demonstrates their force and authority.
These rights have substantial utility for speakers in competition with
34
conflicting viewpoints.'

But most important for the purpose of neutrality theory, charitable
choice authorizes faith-based providers to influence the religious
choices and behavior of recipients through a government funded program. Few actions could be more inconsistent with neutrality toward
35
religion.'

Finally, Glenn's version of neutrality is incomplete as a constitutional doctrine. It fails to account for other important First Amendment values that inform the religion clauses. Neutrality theory seeks

to eliminate government constraints on religious liberty. 136 Although
protecting religious liberty is central to the religion clauses, other values such as ensuring religious (and secular) equality, alleviating religious dissension, and protecting the legitimacy and integrity of both
government and religion are equally important. 3 7 A reference to history is instructive. James Madison, arguably the father of the First
Amendment, distinguished his support for religious liberty from his
concern for the deleterious effects that religious majorities had on
both civil liberties and government. 138 Simply put, Madison believed
that impeding majoritarian impulses would enhance religious equality
in ways that extended beyond merely protecting the liberty interests of
religious minorities.' 3 9 In his Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison
134

Id. at 271-74.

135

See Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra note 90, at 69-71.
See GLENN, supranote 11, at 77-79; MONSIMA, supra note 3, at 18889; Esbeck, supra
note 69, at 4-5.
137
See Brownstein, supra note 90, at 256-67 ("Equality and freedom of speech interests
are simply too essential a part of the constitutional framework relating to religion to be
dismissed as irrelevant or secondary."); Ira C. Lupu, To ControlFaction and ProtestLiberty: A
General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 357, 360 (1996) (discussing
the Religion Clauses' "other animating concerns-to protect religious equality and to con136

trol religious factionalism"); Kathleen M.Sullivan, Religion and LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. Cti.
L. REv. 195, 197-99 (1992).
138 Federalist51 states this concern most clearly
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that
for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in
both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects....
THE FEDERALISr No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
139 In a letter to Thomas Jefferson during the fight over ratification of the Constitution, Madison warned that:
[i]n our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from
acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number
of the constituents.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LE-r
TERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMASJEFFERSON ANDJAMEs MADIsoN 1776-1826, at

562, 564 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995). This statement follows immediately on an ex-
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identified the value of a society based on "equal conditions," with people retaining "equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to
the dictates of Conscience."140 Speaking to those who would promote
religious liberty as the sole value, Madison countered that "[w]hilst we

assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe
the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny
an equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the
evidence which has convinced us." 14 ' Madison also viewed the religion clauses as ensuring the integrity of both government and religion,
writing that religious establishments produce a "spiritual tyranny on
the ruins of the Civil authority," while they undermine the "purity and
efficacy of Religion."'4
A focus on neutrality, however, discounts these values of equality
and government integrity. For example, Glenn's view of neutrality,
with its numerous exemptions for faith-based organizations, empowers such groups to influence the religious choices of religious and secular minorities and distorts the marketplace of ideas by advantaging
His requirement that government afone ideological viewpoint.'
firmatively fashion its programs in ways that not only remove regulatory burdens on faith-based groups, but also facilitate their viewpoints
(as arguably occurs under charitable choice), will result in the government's alignment with the religious approach to social services. In the
end, it will undermine the very appearance of government neutrality
toward religion that Glenn advocates.
MI
TIH JUSTIFCATION FOR VOUCHERS AND CHARITABLE CHOICE
Despite Glenn's promotion of positive neutrality as the legal justification for vouchers and charitable choice, Ambiguous Embrace is less
of a legal treatise and more of ajeremiad about the benefits and dangers of such programs. As a result, his argument for vouchers and
tended discussion about the need for a bill of rights to prevent religious tests and establishments. See iUt
140 James Madison, To the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia a Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), reprintedinJ.Es MDisoN oN, REuLIous UI rzTy 55, 57, 4 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) [hereinafter Rwumous ImEm-TY].
141 Id. The theme of religious equality as distinct from religious liberty runs throughout the Memorial. See id. at 56, 1 (expressing concern that "the majority may trespass on
the rights of the minority"); i&t at 58, 8 (declaring that a "just [g]overnment" must protect"every [c]itizen in the enjoyment of his Religion ith the same equal hand"); id. at 59,
15 (reaffirming "the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience").
142 I& at 58, 1 7,8; see alsoJANMEs MADmsoN, DmrACHED MEMtomA-t., reprintedin REuaIous Di.ERav, supranote 140, at 89, 90 (describing the constitutional "separation between
Religion & Govt" as "[sitrongly guard[ing] ... [against] the danger of encroachment by
Ecclesiastical Bodies").
143 See Brownstein, supranote 90, at 268-78.
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charitable choice varies from most earlier works that have relied on

market approaches, empowerment theories, or claims of program effectiveness. Not that the book is above bashing teachers' unions or

touting the success rates of parochial education and faith-based programs like Teen Challenge.'" Rather, Glenn's justification for vouchers and charitable choice rests on faith-based organizations' unique
contribution to human services and the moral superiority of their programs over comparable services provided by government agencies and
schools.
According to Glenn, the unique ability of faith-based organizations to generate and perpetuate a sense of moral obligation essential
for human service programs justifies vouchers and charitable choice.
Government schools and social service programs are unable to offer
more than an amoral and insensitive approach due to their commitment to professional standards and a system that emphasizes formalism and routinization over substantive goals. In Glenn's view, most
government standards and regulations "have more to do with staffing,
training, accreditation, and salary levels than they do with how children [and the needy] are treated and to what ends."1 4 5 As a result of
this misplaced emphasis on professionalism and standardization, public schools and social service agencies have become ineffective and
unable to change 14 6 Teachers no longer possess a sense of mission
that reaches down to their students and social workers "no longer understand themselves as uplifting humanity, but as attempting-with
14 7
scant success-to patch up the victims of an unjust social order."
According to Glenn, only faith-based agencies can provide the ability
and commitment to instill a "moral judgment" that "carries with it an
8
expectation that a person not only should but can change."14
Glenn's justification for vouchers and charitable choice therefore
has little to do with improving education generally or empowering
low-income parents to take advantage of educational choices-not
that Glenn would be opposed to these goals-or even providing welfare recipients the opportunity to receive services in a manner that
conforms to their religious beliefs. Rather, faith-based institutions
supply a necessary ingredient to civil society, and government-funded
144
145

See GLENN , supra note 11, at 62-73, 175.

Id. at 171.

See i&. at 174 ("The public school itself is no longer seen as the high temple of
democracy and of Americanism (except, in suitably secularized form, in the rhetoric of the
teacher unions), but as a troubled and often ineffective institution on a par with public
housing.").
147
Id. at 175.
148
Id. at 179 "There has been a congruence and mutual reinforcement between this
stance of amoralism-understanding behavior as 'functional' or 'dysfunctional' rather
than right or wrong-and the bureaucratic impersonality, emptied of all normative
themes, characteristic of government provided services." Id.
146
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vouchers and charitable choice will permit individuals to take advantage of religious approaches. Once again, however, Glenn makes too
good a case for faith-based alternatives. If government schools and
agencies are so ineffective and mired in bureaucratic standards, then
vouchers and charitable choice alone are insufficient to address the
problem. Perhaps this is why Ambiguous Embracepoints to the cooperative arrangements in some European countries where private institutions provide the bulk of human services. However, Glenn's reliance
on the European arrangements is incomplete, for he fails to discuss
adequately how the United States can apply those models in light of
the historical and cultural differences between the American and European systems.1 49 Because it is unlikely that the United States will
adopt such arrangements, Glenn sees vouchers and charitable choice
as a way for parents and beneficiaries to take advantage of faith-based
approaches to human services while laying the foundation for more
whole-scale change. 150
Glenn's argument for vouchers breaks the mold in other ways.
Most refreshing are his criticisms of market theories. Glenn urges
that market-based theories are equally incapable of generating the
sense of moral obligation necessary in human services.' 1 In addition,
Glenn argues that "information available about the quality of services
is inevitably imperfect and those who receive publicly funded services
are often poor and characteristically inexperienced at making decisions about such complex matters." 5 2 Glenn also disputes arguments
that vouchers and charitable choice will save public resources. Such
"cost reducing" rationales take advantage of faith-based organizations
and rest on speculative projections of long-term savings based on immediate gains.153 None of these rationales justifies the adoption of
vouchers or charitable choice.
In the end, Glenn's argument does not rely on equal treatment
or empowerment theories; nor does it depend on the purported effectiveness of privately run educational and social service programs compared to their publicly run counterparts. Rather, Glenn's argument
for vouchers and charitable choice rests on the special character of
faith-based human services and on the unique value-shaping role they
perform in civil society.
149
See id. at 110-11, 120-22, 131-64. Glenn also acknowledges that the European models provide "privileged position" to more established religions, but does not explore the
equal protection and free speech implications of such a model in America. Id. at 134-35.
150 See ad at 271-73.

151
152

See id at 25.

Id. at 112.
Id. at 267; see also S.rr-H & Lipsm,, supra note 7, at 19397 (arguing that market
competition in public services will not necessarily prove cost-effective in the long run).
153
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IV
THE THREAT TO INTEGRnTY

Nonlawyers may view the discussion of how government funding
and regulation undermines the integrity and mission of faith-based
organizations as the most important part of the book. Indeed,
Glenn's consideration of the pressures facing religious organizations
that receive government grants, contracts, and vouchers is the book's
most valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about vouchers and
charitable choice. 5 4 For Glenn and other advocates of vouchers and
charitable choice, faith-based organizations must be able to maintain
their distinctiveness or else they will lose their purpose and effectiveness. 155 As this Review has discussed, his vision of neutrality allows
religious organizations to receive public funding but remain exempt

from most oversight and regulation that threatens the integrity of
their mission. However, Glenn wisely acknowledges that mere freedom from regulation provides little protection from the myriad forces
that bombard private organizations when they participate in the public sector. Pressure to professionalize staffs and adapt programming
goals to meet societal expectations and available funding, a growing
dependence on public funding with the incremental compromises it
encourages, and a "voluntary abandonment of... original purpose"
or "loss of nerve" are the leading hazards facing faith-based organizations. 15 6 Government regulation, which often attaches irrespective of
funding, represents a lesser threat to an organization's integrity. 157
One type of regulation remains of utmost concern, however, and
Glenn devotes an entire chapter to discussing why faith-based organizations should be able to hire coreligionists to provide educational
and social services, regardless of whether those positions are publicly
funded. 15 8 For Glenn, there is "probably no aspect of a faith-based
organization's operation that is as important to the continued integrity of its mission as decisions made about hiring staff and disciplining
or firing staff who turn out not to support the distinctive character of
154 Participation of religious organizations in government funding programs raises a
host of legal and policy issues beyond those associated with the Establishment Clause, See
Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation ofReligiously Based Sodal Services: The hirst Amendment
Considerations,19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 343 (1992) (discussing First Amendment implica
flons of religious organization participation in government-funded programs); Dean M.
Kelley, Religious Access to Public Programs and Government Funding, 8 BYU J. Pun. L. 417
(1994) (discussing the long-term negative effect of government contracts for services with

religious organizations); Melissa Rogers, The Wrong Way to Do Right: CharitableChoice and
Churches, in WELFAR REFoRM, supranote 108, at 61-88 (discussing the negative impact of a
church-state partnership upon pervasively sectarian entitites).
155
156
157

See GLEN, supra note 11, at 103-04, 247-51, 290.
Id. at 241.
See id. at 42-61, 165.

158

See id. at 193-211.
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the organization."' 59 Section 702 of Title VII already exempts religious organizations and educational institutions from prohibitions on
religious discrimination, while language in charitable choice explicitly
allows religious grantees to discriminate on religious grounds in the
employment of publicly funded positions. 160 Despite these provisions,
the issue of religious discrimination is hardly a dosed book. Although
the Supreme Court upheld section 702 as a permissible accommodation of religion, it did not find that the Free Exercise Clause mandated the exemption for nonreligious positions. 16 1 Moreover,
although nothing in the law suggests that Title VII's exemption does
not apply to religious organizations simply because they receive public
funding such as Medicare, 16 2 Glenn knows that the constitutionality of
the exemption as it applies to publidy funded positions remains an open
question. 163 Hence, Glenn intends the discussion of employment discrimination to shore up the rather shaky basis for discrimination in
funded programs.

On one level, the ability of faith-based schools and social service
programs to hire only coreligionists ensures that their religious mission will not be hampered, nor their message garbled, by employing
disbelievers in programmatic positions. It guarantees the integrity of
the spiritual approach. 64 The blanket exemption covering all employees-including those engaged in ministerial or programmatic
functions and those in clerical or support roles-also prevents government oversight and interference in the hiring process.16 5
These are all important considerations for Glenn; yet, the need to
discriminate goes much deeper. The ability to employ coreligionists
ensures the freedom of religious schools and agencies "to express a
159

Id. at 197.

160

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) (Supp. IV 1998); 42 US.C.A.

§ 9920(b) (3) (West Supp. 2000).
161
See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of'Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (noting that the Free Exercise Clause probably "required no more" of Title VII than an exemption for religious activities).
162 Young v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., No. 88-2321-S, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12248,
at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1988) (finding that a religious organization's acceptance of Medicare funding on behalf of some patients does not transform the organization into a pub
lidy funded institution).
163
See Dodge v. Salvation Army, No. S88-0353, 1989 WL 53857 (S.D. Miss.Jan. 9, 1989)
(holding unconstitutional section 702 as it applied to an employee in a publicly funded
position). Finally, state and local jurisdictions often attach their own restrictions on private contractors and grantees, including religiously affiliated agencies. See GL.N, supra
note 11, at 109.
164 SeeGLz,
supra note 11, at 196-97, 201, 205. Glenn believes this ability to discriminate is crucial, quoting Stephen Monsma for the proposition that "[i]f the teachers or
other staff of a nonprofit agency cannot be hired on the basis of their faith commitments,
the religious character of that nonprofit would be destroyed." Id. at 196 (quoting Moxs %,

supranote 12, at 126).
165 See i&L
at 199; Amaos, 483 U.S. at 336.
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distinctive ethos and character" and of their teachers and social workers to teach and minister "in a way consistent with that ethos and character."16 6 In essence, the exemption protects the "collective freedom"
of all employees to further that shared ethos, thereby preserving a
form of collective "academic freedom" not enjoyed by government
teachers and social workers. 167 For Glenn, the "moral coherence that
they derive from a shared ethos" is a primary strength of faith-based
institutions. 168 Thus correctly understood, the ability to employ only
coreligionists is not an issue of discrimination but one of freedom, of
the right of teachers and social workers to work in an institution
where there is a shared vision of human service. By emphasizing the
collective freedom guaranteed by the Title VII exemption, Glenn
seeks to turn the issue of discrimination on its head. 169 However, the
unintended consequence of shifting the focus to preserving the
shared religious vision of faith-based organizations is that it highlights
the Establishment Clause concern that allowing discrimination in
publicly funded positions furthers the religious mission of the
organizations.
Missing from Glenn's discussion is a consideration of whether the
ability to employ coreligionists should turn on the type of funding
program-contract, grant, or voucher-or on whether a faith-based
organization is assuming the roles of government actors, such as deciding eligibility for benefits. 170 Arguments supporting discrimination
might also be more compelling depending on the type of position
(e.g., substance abuse counselor versus custodian; religious studies
teacher versus cafeteria worker). This would have been a useful discussion, but one can appreciate Glenn's hesitation to distinguish between funding mechanisms or positions, thereby excluding certain
programs and relationships from the protection of section 702. Of additional concern for Glenn is that Title VII still prohibits religious organizations from discriminating on nonreligious grounds, such as
race and gender. 17 1 As a result, he argues that courts should treat
supra note 11, at 198.
Id. at 198-99. "It is therefore possible to speak of the collective freedom of teaching
... that supports the freedom of teachers to the extent that they work in a school that corresponds
to their own convictions about education." Id. at 198 (internal quotation omitted).
168
Id. at 199.
169
See id. at 196-206.
166

GLENN,

167

170

Because the application of Title VII, unlike Title VI, does not turn on the existence

of government funding, rules governing state action do not necessarily apply.
171 Raybum v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir.
1985) ("While the language of § 702 makes clear that religious institutions may base relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences, Title VII does not confer upon religious
organizations a license to make those same decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin." (citations omitted)); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277 (9th

Cir. 1982) ("Every court that has considered Title VI's applicability to religious employers
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religious school teachers and social service workers in faith-based
agencies as the equivalent of clergy, because they too interpret doctrine and represent the mission of the organization. Therefore, they
too should fall under the judicially recognized "ministerial exception"
to Title VII that forbids all inquiry into the motivation for employment decisions affecting clergy. 172 As of yet, the ministerial exception
has not been applied so broadly.17 3 However, under Glenn's proposed interpretation, religious schools and social service agencies
could not only insist that teachers and social workers be coreligionists,

but also that they be of a particular race, gender, or national origin.
The importance of maintaining the distinctive character of the faithbased organization's mission would prevail over the public interest in
eradicating discrimination.
Finally, Glenn's discussion of employment decision making also
fails to consider how the privilege to discriminate fits with notions of
neutrality. To be sure, Glenn's view of positive neutrality exempts religious organizations from those regulations that threaten their religious identity and mission. Nevertheless, while this view accounts for
religious autonomy concerns, it does not consider the distinct advantage the ability to discriminate affords religious organizations. On
one level, the ability to hire only coreligionists provides an economic
advantage over secular charitable organizations, making the former
more competitive in obtaining grants. Employing only coreligionists
also impacts neutrality by affecting the religious choices of beneficiaries. Enhancing the ability of faith-based organizations to communicate their religious goals will inevitably limit the religious choices of
has concluded that Congress intended to prohibit religious organizations from discriminating among their employees on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.").
172 See GLENN, supranote 11, at 197-98; see also Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of the
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause barred a female clergy member's Title VII employment discrimination suit
against a church); Young v. N. 1ll. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184,186 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding the same with respect to a suit brought by an African-American female
clergy member); RayburM, 772 F.2d at 1169 (holding the same with respect to a sex and
racial discrimination suit); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding the same with respect to a sex discrimination suit).
17- See Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting ministerial exception for administrative position in s)agogue); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding
exception for seminary professors but rejecting it for administrative and support staff). But
see Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding exception for nonordained choir director), eetr denie, No. 99-1827, 2000 WL 655917 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2000);
EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding exception
"fornun denied tenure in department of Canon Law). The court stated in Catholic University. "The ministerial exception has not been limited to members of the clergy. It has also
been applied to lay employees of religious institutions whose 'primary duties consist of
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual or worship.' Id. at 461 (quoting Raybum, 772
F.2d at 1169).
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those seeking the services. So while exemptions minimize interference with the religious choices of faith-based organizations, they maximize such interference with beneficiaries. Such unequal treatment
cannot be justified under a rubric of neutrality.
CONCLUSION

Ambiguous Embrace is an important addition to the growing body
of literature about the inclusion of faith-based organizations and
schools in government human service programs. Its most significant
contribution to the debate is its consideration of the myriad dangers
facing faith-based organizations when they decide to participate in
government-funded programs. In particular, Ambiguous Embrace highlights the difficulties faced by faith-based organizations in maintaining
their integrity and sense of mission in light of pressures toward professionalization and standardization.
Unfortunately, the book's shortcomings tend to overshadow
these valuable insights. Glenn fails to fully develop his arguments for
privatization and the adoption of positive neutrality as the operative
standard for Establishment Clause adjudication. This is not to suggest
that these arguments are not worthy of discussion. On the contrary,
Ambiguous Embrace raises important questions about the overlapping
roles of public and private spheres and the extent to which government programs should be receptive to religious alternatives. The
shortcomings rest in the book's failure to fully explore the implications of the arguments it raises, such as the restricted role of the government in education and social services and the unequal effect of a
jurisprudence based on positive neutrality.

